Protecting SGX Enclaves from AEX-based Attacks with Strongbox

Primary supervisor

Shujie Cui

Intel SGX is a kind of trusted hardware that can provide a trusted execution environment for running secret-senstive operations.  However, the hardware suffers from side-channel attacks with which attackers could infer the shielded secret. We have proposed a tool, called Strongbox, to protect SGX enclaves from interrupt-based attacks. 

Student cohort

Single Semester
Double Semester

Aim/outline

This project aims to implement a prototype of Strongbox with C/C++ by adding a new machine function pass to the LLVM compilation backend, and then evaluate the performance and false negatives of Strongbox with different applications.  

 

Required knowledge

1. Familiar with C/C++ programming

2. Knowledgeable with X86 assembling instructions

3. Knowledgeable with the operating system, especially knowing the task scheduling and interrupt handling

4. Knowledgeable with Linux kernel