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Asymmetric games between journals and scientists

Primary supervisor

Julian Garcia Gallego


  • Toby Handfield (Philosophy)

This project is based on the paper "Academic Journals, Incentives, and the Quality of Peer Review: A Model", in which we analyse strategic interactions between scientists and science journals.  Our results shed light on how different objectives for journals shape the strategies that scientists adopt when aiming to publish their work. In this project, we aim to extend this model to include the influence of different environmental factors such as prestige, affiliations or career stage of the scientists. We will use game theory, computer simulations and data science for validating and testing the models when possible. 


Student cohort

Double Semester


Zollman KJS, García J, Handfield T. Academic Journals, Incentives, and the Quality of Peer Review: A Model. Philosophy of Science. 2024;91(1):186-203. doi:10.1017/psa.2023.81

Required knowledge

An interest in mathematical and computational modelling, excellent programming skills and a solid mathematical background. Having taken FIT3139 is a plus.